## Claims as Filed in Amendment dated August 17, 2006

## **Listing of Claims:**

- 1-12. (Cancelled)
- 13. (Currently Amended) A system for producing asymmetric cryptographic keys, said keys comprising  $m \ge 1$  private values  $Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_m$  and m respective public values  $G_1, G_2, ..., G_m$ , the system comprising:

a processor; and

a memory unit coupled to the processor, the memory unit storing a set of instructions which when executed cause the processor to execute the following acts:

selecting a security parameter k, wherein k is an integer greater than 1;

selecting m base numbers  $g_1, g_2, ..., g_m$ , wherein each base number  $g_i$  (for i = 1, ..., m) is an integer greater than 1;

determining a modulus n, wherein n is a public integer equal to the product of at least two prime factors  $p_1,...,p_f$ , at least two of these prime factors, say  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , being such that  $p_1 \equiv 3 \mod 4$  and  $p_2 \equiv 3 \mod 4$ ;

selecting  $\underline{m}$  base numbers  $\underline{g_1, g_2, ..., g_m}$ , wherein each base number  $\underline{g_i}$  (for  $\underline{i=1,...,m}$ ) is an integer greater than 1 and is a non-quadratic residue of the ring of integers modulo  $\underline{n}$ , and such that  $p_2$  is complementary to  $p_1$  with respect to one of the base numbers;

calculating the public values  $G_i$  for i = 1,...,m through  $G_i \equiv g_i^2 \mod n$ ; and

calculating the private values  $Q_i$  for i=1,...,m by solving either the equation  $G_i \cdot Q_i^{\nu} \equiv 1 \mod n$  or the equation  $G_i \equiv Q_i^{\nu} \mod n$ , wherein the public exponent  $\nu$  is such that  $\nu = 2^k$ .

14. (Previously presented) The system according to claim 13, wherein the number (f - e) (where  $e \ge 0$ ) of prime factors of the modulus n which are congruent to 3 mod 4 is larger than 2, and those prime factors  $p_{j+1}$  for  $2 \le j \le m$  which are congruent to 3 mod 4 are determined iteratively as follows:

the profile  $profile_j(g_j)$  of  $g_j$  with respect to the prime factors  $p_1, p_2, ..., p_j$  is computed, and

if  $\operatorname{profile}_j(g_j)$  is flat, then the prime factor  $p_{j+1}$  is chosen such that  $p_{j+1}$  is complementary to  $p_1$  with respect to  $g_j$ ; else, a number g is chosen among the (j-1) base numbers  $g_1, g_2, ..., g_{j-1}$  and all of their multiplicative combinations, such that  $\operatorname{profile}_j(g) = \operatorname{profile}_j(g_j)$ , then  $p_{j+1}$  is chosen such that  $\operatorname{profile}_{j+1}(g_j) \neq \operatorname{profile}_{j+1}(g)$ ,

wherein the last prime factor  $p_{f-e}$  congruent to 3 mod 4 is, in the case that  $f-e \le m$ , chosen such that  $p_{f-e}$  is complementary to  $p_1$  with respect to all of the base numbers  $g_i$  such that  $f-e \le i \le m$  and whose profile profile f-e-1 ( $g_i$ ) is flat.

15. (Previously Presented) The system according to claim 13, wherein the number e of prime factors of the modulus n which are congruent to 1 mod 4 is at least equal to 1, and each such prime factor is determined as follows:

a candidate prime number p is chosen, such that the Legendre symbol of each base number  $g_i$  (for i = 1,...,m) with respect to p is equal to +1,

the integer t is computed which is such that (p-1) is divisible by  $2^t$ , but not by  $2^{t+1}$ ,

the integer  $s = (p-1+2^{t})/2^{t+1}$  is computed,

an integer  $b \equiv h^{p-1/2'} \mod p$ , where h is a non-quadratic residue of the body of integers modulo p, is computed,

the *m* integers  $r_i \equiv g_i^{2s} \mod p$  for i = 1,...,m are computed,

an integer u is initialized to u = 0,

the following sequence of steps, where i is initialized to 1, is iteratively implemented:

an integer w is initialized to  $w = r_i$ ,

if  $r_i = \pm g_i$ , the value of i is incremented and a sequence of steps with the new value of i is proceeded to if i < m, whereas the candidate prime number p is accepted as a factor of the modulus n if i = m,

if  $r_i \neq \pm g_i$ :

an integer jj is initialized to 1,

the following sequence of steps, where an integer ii is initialized to 1, is iteratively implemented:

 $x \equiv w^2/g_i^2 \mod p$  is computed,

 $y \equiv x^{2^{t-ii-1}} \mod p$  is computed, and

if y = +1, the sequence is terminated at the current value of ii,

if y = -1, jj is assigned the value  $jj = 2^{ii}$ , the number w is assigned a new value equal to the old value multiplied by  $b^{ij}$  modulo p, and

for ii < t - 2, the value of ii is incremented and a new iteration is proceeded to with the new value of ii,

for ii = t - 2, the value of number u is updated through the relation  $jj = 2^{t-u}$ , and

if t - u < k, the candidate prime number p is rejected as a factor of the modulus n,

if t - u > k, the value of i is incremented and a sequence of steps with the new value of i is proceeded to if i < m, whereas the candidate prime number p is accepted as a factor of the modulus n if i = m.

16. (Previously presented) The system according to claim 15, wherein, to compute the  $f \cdot m$  private components  $Q_{i,j}$  of the private values  $Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_m$ , the following steps are implemented for each couple (i, j):

an integer t is determined, which is equal to 1 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 3 mod 4, and to the value obtained for t according to claim 15 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 1 mod 4,

an integer u is determined, which is equal to 0 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 3 mod 4, and to the value obtained for u according to claim 15 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 1 mod 4,

the integer  $z \equiv G_i^s \mod p_j$  is computed, where  $s = (p-1+2^t)/2^{t+1}$ , all the numbers zz are being considered, which:

if u = 0, are such that zz = z or such that zz is equal to the product modulo  $p_j$  of z by each of the  $2^{ii-1}$   $2^{ii}$ -th primitive roots of unity, for ii ranging from 1 to  $\min(k,t)$ ,

if u > 0, are such that zz is equal to the product modulo  $p_j$  of za by each of the  $2^k$   $2^k$ -th roots of unity, where za is the value obtained for w according to claim 15, and

for each such number zz, a value for the component  $Q_{i,j}$  is obtained by taking  $Q_{i,j}$  equal to zz if the equation  $G_i \equiv Q_i^{\ \nu} \mod n$  is used, or to the inverse of zz modulo  $p_j$  if  $G_i \cdot Q_i^{\ \nu} \equiv 1 \mod n$  is used for this value of i.

17. (Currently Amended) A computer-readable storage medium storing instructions for producing asymmetric cryptographic keys, said keys comprising  $m \ge 1$  private values  $Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_m$  and m respective public values  $G_1, G_2, ..., G_m$ , the medium storing instructions which when executed cause a processor to execute the following acts:

selecting a security parameter k, wherein k is an integer greater than 1;

selecting m base numbers  $g_1, g_2, ..., g_m$ , wherein each base number  $g_i$  (for i = 1, ..., m) is an integer greater than 1;

determining a modulus n, wherein n is a public integer equal to the product of at least two prime factors  $p_1,...,p_f$ , at least two of these prime factors, say  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , being such that  $p_1 \equiv 3 \mod 4$  and  $p_2 \equiv 3 \mod 4$ ;

selecting  $\underline{m}$  base numbers  $\underline{g_1, g_2, ..., g_m}$ , wherein each base number  $\underline{g_i}$  (for  $\underline{i=1,...,m}$ ) is an integer greater than 1 and is a non-quadratic residue of the ring of integers modulo  $\underline{n}$ , and such that  $p_2$  is complementary to  $p_1$  with respect to one of the base numbers;

calculating the public values  $G_i$  for i=1,...,m through  $G_i \equiv g_i^2 \mod n$ ; and calculating the private values  $Q_i$  for i=1,...,m by solving either the equation  $G_i \cdot Q_i^{\ \nu} \equiv 1 \mod n$  or the equation  $G_i \equiv Q_i^{\ \nu} \mod n$ , wherein the public exponent  $\nu$  is such that  $\nu=2^k$ .

18. (Previously presented) The computer-readable storage medium storing instructions according to claim 17, wherein the number (f - e) (where  $e \ge 0$ ) of prime factors of the modulus n which are congruent to 3 mod 4 is larger than 2, and those prime factors  $p_{j+1}$  for  $2 \le j \le m$  which are congruent to 3 mod 4 are determined iteratively as follows:

the profile  $profile_j(g_j)$  of  $g_j$  with respect to the prime factors  $p_1, p_2, ..., p_j$  is computed, and

if  $\operatorname{profile}_j(g_j)$  is flat, then the prime factor  $p_{j+1}$  is chosen such that  $p_{j+1}$  is complementary to  $p_1$  with respect to  $g_j$ ; else, a number g is chosen among the (j-1) base numbers  $g_1, g_2, ..., g_{j-1}$  and all of their multiplicative combinations, such that  $\operatorname{profile}_j(g) = \operatorname{profile}_j(g_j)$ , then  $p_{j+1}$  is chosen such that  $\operatorname{profile}_{j+1}(g_j) \neq \operatorname{profile}_{j+1}(g)$ ,

wherein the last prime factor  $p_{f-e}$  congruent to 3 mod 4 is, in the case that  $f-e \le m$ , chosen such that  $p_{f-e}$  is complementary to  $p_1$  with respect to all of the base numbers  $g_i$  such that  $f-e \le i \le m$  and whose profile profile  $f_{-e-1}(g_i)$  is flat.

19. (Previously presented) The computer-readable storage medium storing instructions according to claim 17, wherein the number e of prime factors of the modulus n which are congruent to 1 mod 4 is at least equal to 1, and each such prime factor is determined as follows:

a candidate prime number p is chosen, such that the Legendre symbol of each base number  $g_i$  (for i = 1,...,m) with respect to p is equal to +1,

the integer t is computed which is such that (p-1) is divisible by  $2^t$ , but not by  $2^{t+1}$ ,

the integer  $s = (p-1+2^t)/2^{t+1}$  is computed,

an integer  $b \equiv h^{p-1/2'} \mod p$ , where h is a non-quadratic residue of the body of integers modulo p, is computed,

the *m* integers  $r_i \equiv g_i^{2s} \mod p$  for i = 1,...,m are computed,

an integer u is initialized to u = 0,

the following sequence of steps, where i is initialized to 1, is iteratively implemented:

an integer w is initialized to  $w = r_i$ ,

if  $r_i = \pm g_i$ , the value of i is incremented and a sequence of steps with the new value of i is proceeded to if i < m, whereas the candidate prime number p is accepted as a factor of the modulus n if i = m,

if  $r_i \neq \pm g_i$ :

an integer jj is initialized to 1,

the following sequence of steps, where an integer *ii* is initialized to 1, is iteratively implemented:

 $x \equiv w^2 / g_i^2 \mod p$  is computed,

 $y \equiv x^{2^{t-ii-1}} \mod p$  is computed, and

if y = +1, the sequence is terminated at the current value of ii,

if y = -1, jj is assigned the value  $jj = 2^{ii}$ , the number w is assigned a new value equal to the old value multiplied by  $b^{jj}$  modulo p, and

for ii < t-2, the value of ii is incremented and a new iteration is proceeded to with the new value of ii,

for ii = t - 2, the value of number u is updated through the relation  $jj = 2^{t-u}$ , and

if t - u < k, the candidate prime number p is rejected as a factor of the modulus n,

if t - u > k, the value of i is incremented and a sequence of steps with the new value of i is proceeded to if i < m, whereas the candidate prime number p is accepted as a factor of the modulus n if i = m.

20. (Previously Presented) The computer-readable storage medium storing instructions according to claim 19, wherein, to compute the  $f \cdot m$  private components  $Q_{i,j}$  of the private values  $Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_m$ , the following steps are implemented for each couple (i, j):

an integer t is determined, which is equal to 1 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 3 mod 4, and to the value obtained for t according to claim 19 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 1 mod 4,

an integer u is determined, which is equal to 0 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 3 mod 4, and to the value obtained for u according to claim 19 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 1 mod 4,

the integer  $z \equiv G_i^s \mod p_j$  is computed, where  $s = (p-1+2^t)/2^{t+1}$ ,

all the numbers zz are being considered, which:

if u = 0, are such that zz = z or such that zz is equal to the product modulo  $p_j$  of z by each of the  $2^{ii-1}$   $2^{ii}$ -th primitive roots of unity, for ii ranging from 1 to  $\min(k,t)$ ,

if u > 0, are such that zz is equal to the product modulo  $p_j$  of za by each of the  $2^k$   $2^k$ -th roots of unity, where za is the value obtained for w according to claim 19, and

for each such number zz, a value for the component  $Q_{i,j}$  is obtained by taking  $Q_{i,j}$  equal to zz if the equation  $G_i \equiv Q_i^{\ \nu} \mod n$  is used, or to the inverse of zz modulo  $p_j$  if  $G_i \cdot Q_i^{\ \nu} \equiv 1 \mod n$  is used for this value of i.

21. (Currently Amended) A computer-implemented process for producing asymmetric cryptographic keys, said keys comprising  $m \ge 1$  private values  $Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_m$  and m respective public values  $G_1, G_2, ..., G_m$ , the computer-implemented process comprising:

selecting a security parameter k, wherein k is an integer greater than 1;

selecting m base numbers  $g_1, g_2, ..., g_m$ , wherein each base number  $g_i$  (for i = 1, ..., m) is an integer greater than 1;

determining a modulus n, wherein n is a public integer equal to the product of at least two prime factors  $p_1,...,p_f$ , at least two of these prime factors, say  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , being such that  $p_1 \equiv 3 \mod 4$  and  $p_2 \equiv 3 \mod 4$ ;

selecting  $\underline{m}$  base numbers  $\underline{g_1, g_2, ..., g_m}$ , wherein each base number  $\underline{g_i}$  (for  $\underline{i=1,...,m}$ ) is an integer greater than 1 and is a non-quadratic residue of the ring of integers modulo  $\underline{n}$ , and such that  $\underline{p_2}$  is complementary to  $\underline{p_1}$  with respect to one of the base numbers;

calculating the public values  $G_i$  for i=1,...,m through  $G_i \equiv g_i^2 \mod n$ ; and calculating the private values  $Q_i$  for i=1,...,m by solving either the equation  $G_i \cdot Q_i^{\nu} \equiv 1 \mod n$  or the equation  $G_i \equiv Q_i^{\nu} \mod n$ , wherein the public exponent  $\nu$  is such that  $\nu = 2^k$ .

22. (Previously Presented) The computer-implemented process according to claim 21, wherein the number (f-e) (where  $e \ge 0$ ) of prime factors of the modulus n which are congruent to 3 mod 4 is larger than 2, and those prime factors  $p_{j+1}$  for  $2 \le j \le m$  which are congruent to 3 mod 4 are determined iteratively as follows:

the profile  $profile_j(g_j)$  of  $g_j$  with respect to the prime factors  $p_1, p_2, ..., p_j$  is computed, and

if  $\operatorname{profile}_{j}(g_{j})$  is flat, then the prime factor  $p_{j+1}$  is chosen such that  $p_{j+1}$  is complementary to  $p_{1}$  with respect to  $g_{j}$ ; else, a number g is chosen among the (j-1) base

numbers  $g_1, g_2, ..., g_{j-1}$  and all of their multiplicative combinations, such that  $profile_i(g) = profile_i(g_i)$ , then  $p_{j+1}$  is chosen such that  $profile_{j+1}(g_i) \neq profile_{j+1}(g)$ ,

wherein the last prime factor  $p_{f-e}$  congruent to 3 mod 4 is, in the case that  $f-e \le m$ , chosen such that  $p_{f-e}$  is complementary to  $p_1$  with respect to all of the base numbers  $g_i$  such that  $f-e \le i \le m$  and whose profile profile f-e-1 ( $g_i$ ) is flat.

23. (Previously Presented) The computer-implemented process according to claim 21, wherein the number e of prime factors of the modulus n which are congruent to 1 mod 4 is at least equal to 1, and each such prime factor is determined as follows:

a candidate prime number p is chosen, such that the Legendre symbol of each base number  $g_i$  (for i = 1,...,m) with respect to p is equal to +1,

the integer t is computed which is such that (p-1) is divisible by  $2^t$ , but not by  $2^{t+1}$ , the integer  $s = (p-1+2^t)/2^{t+1}$  is computed,

an integer  $b \equiv h^{p-1/2'} \mod p$ , where h is a non-quadratic residue of the body of integers modulo p, is computed,

the *m* integers  $r_i \equiv g_i^{2s} \mod p$  for i = 1,...,m are computed,

an integer u is initialized to u = 0,

the following sequence of steps, where i is initialized to 1, is iteratively implemented:

an integer w is initialized to  $w = r_i$ ,

if  $r_i = \pm g_i$ , the value of i is incremented and a sequence of steps with the new value of i is proceeded to if i < m, whereas the candidate prime number p is accepted as a factor of the modulus n if i = m,

if  $r_i \neq \pm g_i$ :

an integer jj is initialized to 1,

the following sequence of steps, where an integer *ii* is initialized to 1, is iteratively implemented:

 $x \equiv w^2 / g_i^2 \mod p$  is computed,

 $y \equiv x^{2^{t-ii-1}} \mod p$  is computed, and

if y = +1, the sequence is terminated at the current value of ii,

if y = -1, jj is assigned the value  $jj = 2^{ii}$ , the number w is assigned a new value equal to the old value multiplied by  $b^{ij}$  modulo p, and

for ii < t-2, the value of ii is incremented and a new iteration is proceeded to with the new value of ii,

for ii = t - 2, the value of number u is updated through the relation  $jj = 2^{t-u}$ , and

if t - u < k, the candidate prime number p is rejected as a factor of the modulus n,

if t - u > k, the value of i is incremented and a sequence of steps with the new value of i is proceeded to if i < m, whereas the candidate prime number p is accepted as a factor of the modulus n if i = m.

24. (Previously Presented) The computer-implemented process according to claim 23, wherein, to compute the  $f \cdot m$  private components  $Q_{i,j}$  of the private values  $Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_m$ , the following steps are implemented for each couple (i, j):

an integer t is determined, which is equal to 1 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 3 mod 4, and to the value obtained for t according to claim 23 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 1 mod 4,

an integer u is determined, which is equal to 0 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 3 mod 4, and to the value obtained for u according to claim 23 if  $p_j$  is congruent to 1 mod 4,

the integer  $z \equiv G_i^s \mod p_j$  is computed, where  $s = (p-1+2^t)/2^{t+1}$ ,

all the numbers zz are being considered, which:

if u = 0, are such that zz = z or such that zz is equal to the product modulo  $p_j$  of z by each of the  $2^{ii-1}$   $2^{ii}$ -th primitive roots of unity, for ii ranging from 1 to  $\min(k,t)$ ,

if u > 0, are such that zz is equal to the product modulo  $p_j$  of za by each of the  $2^k$   $2^k$ -th roots of unity, where za is the value obtained for w according to claim 23, and

for each such number zz, a value for the component  $Q_{i,j}$  is obtained by taking  $Q_{i,j}$  equal to zz if the equation  $G_i \equiv Q_i^{\ \nu} \mod n$  is used, or to the inverse of zz modulo  $p_j$  if  $G_i \cdot Q_i^{\ \nu} \equiv 1 \mod n$  is used for this value of i.